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Secure Scheme for Locating Disease-Causing Genes Based on
Multi-Key Homomorphic Encryption
Tanping Zhou , Wenchao Liu, Ningbo Li, Xiaoyuan Yang , Yiliang Han, and Shangwen Zheng
Abstract: Genes have great significance for the prevention and treatment of some diseases. A vital consideration is
the need to find a way to locate pathogenic genes by analyzing the genetic data obtained from different medical
institutions while protecting the privacy of patients’ genetic data. In this paper, we present a secure scheme for
locating disease-causing genes based on Multi-Key Homomorphic Encryption (MKHE), which reduces the risk of
leaking genetic data. First, we combine MKHE with a frequency-based pathogenic gene location function. The
medical institutions use MKHE to encrypt their genetic data. The cloud then homomorphically evaluates specific
gene-locating circuits on the encrypted genetic data. Second, whereas most location circuits are designed only
for locating monogenic diseases, we propose two location circuits (TH-intersection and Top-q) that can locate the
disease-causing genes of polygenic diseases. Third, we construct a directed decryption protocol in which the users
involved in the homomorphic evaluation can appoint a target user who can obtain the final decryption result. Our
experimental results show that compared to the JWB+17 scheme published in the journal Science, our scheme can
be used to diagnose polygenic diseases, and the participants only need to upload their encrypted genetic data once,
which reduces the communication traffic by a few hundred-fold.
Key words: public key encryption; Multi-Key Homomorphic Encryption (MKHE); fully homomorphic encryption;
disease-causing genes; secure location of disease-causing genes
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are directly related to genes. Genetic data can be
widely used in healthcare, biomedical research[1, 2] and
identification, and the prevention and treatment of
diseases, such as cancer and albinism. Such diseases
are generally caused by a malignant mutation in the
genes, so identifying the location of these pathogenic
genes via genetic diagnosis is an important prerequisite
for targeted disease treatment. As such, the development
of a scheme for locating disease-causing genes is of vital
importance.
With the continuous developments in biomedicine
and the decreasing cost of genome sequencing[3] , more
and more people can access their own genetic data. To
identify the root cause of a patient’s disease, the patient’s
genome must be compared with as many other genomes
as possible, both those affected and unaffected, related
and unrelated[4] , to increase the accuracy of locating
disease-causing genes. However, personalized genomes
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contain characteristics that have strong personal privacy
implications[5] , and if insufficiently protected, it may
lead to problems such as genetic discrimination[6] and
criminal activity. Therefore, resolving the contradiction
between the protection of privacy and the effective
analysis of genetic data is an urgent problem in the
healthcare industry. In 2017, Jagadeesh et al.[4] provided
an alternative scheme JWB+17 for secure location of
disease-causing gene, which combines a cryptographic
method called Yao’s protocol[7] with frequency-based
clinical genetics for diagnosing causal disease mutations
in patients with monogenic disorders. As reported in
Ref. [4], three Boolean circuits are useful for patient
diagnosis: the intersection, MAX, and SET DIFF
circuits, and Ref. [4] proposed a “two-cloud” model
to extend Yao’s protocol and realized a secure multiparty
computation protocol. However, in our analysis of
JWB+17, we found the following defects:
(1) The Boolean circuits used in Ref. [4] are only
applicable to monogenic diseases and cannot be applied
to polygenic diseases, and the construction of the SET
DIFF circuit is not sufficiently compact, which affects
the circuit’s implementation efficiency.
(2) To circumvent the limitation that requires all
participating parties to be online during the execution
of Yao’s protocol and have the potential for a
communication breakdown, Ref. [4] used a “two-cloud”
model for general multiparty computation. However,
this model is based on the assumption that the two-cloud
servers are non-colluding, which is not always the case
in the real world, and may represent a large security risk.
In addition, the two-cloud model requires more complex
gabled circuits than the original Yao’s protocol, which
affects the scheme’s efficiency. Moreover, these gabled
circuits cannot be reused during protocol execution,
which results in heavy communication traffic.
To address the above two issues, in this paper,
we consider the use of Multi-Key Homomorphic
Encryption (MKHE)[8] to enable the secure computation
and analysis of genetic data. With MKHE, arbitrary
operations on encrypted data can be performed under
different public keys (participants), which means it is
more powerful than the traditional Fully Homomorphic
Encryption (FHE)[9, 10] , and the final ciphertext can
be jointly decrypted by all the participants[11] . MKHE
is a powerful tool for realizing secure multiparty
computation[12] , in which every participant can protect
their own genetic data by holding their own secret keys,
with no need for the cloud to be non-colluding. The
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encryption of the same genetic data can also be reused,
which provides a better solution for securely locating
a disease-causing gene. At present, the security of
most MKHE schemes can be reduced to the worst-case
hardness of ideal lattice problems. References [13–16]
also attempt to analyze gene data using homomorphic
encryption schemes, but their schemes are based on
single-key homomorphic encryption and cannot be
applied to scenarios with multi-source gene data.
Our work: In this paper, we propose a secure
scheme for locating disease-causing genes based on
MKHE. Our scheme can locate pathogenic genes by
homomorphically analyzing the ciphertexts of multiple
different medical institutions, thus significantly reducing
the risk of leaking genetic data.
(1) As MKHE supports computations for encrypted
data from different participants, we combine MKHE and
a frequency-based pathogenic gene location function.
The medical institutions encrypt their genetic data
using MKHE scheme CCS19[17] , then the cloud
homomorphically implements the specific location
circuits, and the resulting ciphertext is sent to all the
involved medical institutions for joint decryption.
(2) We propose two location circuits Threshold (TH)intersection & Top-q), which can be used for the
diagnosis of polygenic diseases. Most current location
circuits are only suitable for monogenic disease, as they
set a fixed threshold, whereas the TH-intersection circuit
outputs all the gene positions, for which the sum of the
mutated genetic data of all patients is larger than a given
threshold. By setting a fixed parameter q, the Top-q
circuit outputs the Top-q gene positions that exhibit a
high frequency of common mutation among all patients.
(3) We construct a directed decryption protocol that
allows the evaluated ciphertext to be decrypted by
any target user. Note that the evaluated ciphertext
in CCS19 and the most current MKHE schemes are
decrypted by all involved users, each of whom will
also receive the results, which may be inappropriate
for a scenario, in which the evaluated ciphertext should
be decrypted by only appointed (target) user. For this
situation, we construct a directed decryption protocol, in
which the users involved in the homomorphic evaluation
can appoint a target user, who will receive the final
decryption results, thereby enhancing the ability of the
data owner to control their messages.
Experimental results show that compared to the
JWB+17 scheme, the participants in our scheme must
only upload their encrypted genetic data once, and the
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communication traffic is reduced by a few hundred-fold.
In addition, our scheme does not require the participants
to be online in real time, which makes it more suitable
for systems with limited bandwidth.

2
2.1

Preliminary
Definition of MKHE

Definition 1 Leveled MKHE[9] . Given the security
parameter , let C be a class of circuits. A leveled
multi-key FHE scheme E D .Setup; KeyGen; Enc;
Extend; Eval; Dec/ is described as follows:
• pp
E :Setup.1 ; 1K ; 1L /: Given the security
parameter , the circuit depth L, and the upper bound
K on the number of users, output the public parameters
pp.
• .pki ; ski ; evki /
E :KeyGen.pp/: Given the
public parameter pp, derive and output of the public
key pki , secret key ski , and the evaluation keys evki of
user i(i D 1; : : : ; K).
• ci
E :Enc.pki ;mi /: Given the public key pki
and message mi , output a ciphertext ci .
• cOSi
E :Extend.ci ; .pki1 ; : : : ; pkik /; emi /: On
the input of a ciphertext ci , the public keys
.pki1 ; : : : ; pkik / corresponding to user set Si , which
are incorporated into the homomorphic computations
for participant i , and the related materials e mi used in
the ciphertext extension, output the extended ciphertext
cOSi , whose corresponding secret key is a combination of
.ski1 ; : : : ; skik /.
• cOS E :Eval.C ; .cOS1 ; pkS1 ; evkS1 /; : : : ;.cOS t ; pkS t ;
evkS t //: Upon the input of a Boolean circuit C along
with t tuples .cOSi ; pkSi ; evkSi /i DŒ1;t  , with each tuple
comprising a ciphertext cOSi corresponding to user set Si ,
a set of public keys pkSi D fpkj ; 8j 2 Si g, and the
evaluation keys evkSi , output the evaluated ciphertext
cOS , corresponding to user set S D [ti D1 Si  Œ1; K.

P1

P2

g
g
g

Gene sequencing

g
g
g

Medical institution

• mS
E :Dec..ski1 ; ski2 ; : : : ; skik /; cS /: Given a
ciphertext cS corresponding to a set of users S D fi1 ;
i2 ; : : : ; ik g  Œ1; K, and secret keys skS D fski1 ; ski2 ;
: : : ; skik g, output the message mS .
Definition 2 Correctness of MKHE. Upon input
of any circuit C of depth at most L, a set
of tuplesf.cSi ; pkSi ; evkSi /gi 2Œ1;t  , and secret keys
skSi D fskj ; 8j 2 Si g, let i D Dec.skSi ; cSi /, and
S D [ti D1 Si  Œ1; K. A leveled MKHE scheme E is
correct if it holds that
Dec.skS; Eval.C;.cSi; pkSi; evkSi/i 2Œ1;t  //DC .1 ;: : : ; t /:
Definition 3 Compactness of MKHE. A leveled
MKHE scheme is compact if there exists a polynomial
poly.; ; /, such that jcj 6 poly.; K; L/, which means
that the length of c is independent of the circuit C , but
depends on the security parameter , the number of
users K, and the circuit depth L.
Preprocessing of genetic data: The research subjects
go to a medical institution to have their genes sequenced
and to obtain their own genetic data. The medical
institution creates a mutated vector for every research
subject, and compares the obtained genetic data with
those in the genetic mutation database (the items in
the database are the positions and mutation information
of the genetic mutation). If the researcher’s mutation
matches that in the database at a specific gene position,
then the corresponding gene position vector is set to
1, otherwise it is set to 0. As such, each research
subject has a unique bit string for their own genetic
variation information. Figure 1 shows a flowchart of the
preprocessing operation.
2.2

CCS19 scheme

The underlying MKHE scheme is based on an optimized
CCS19 scheme (see Section 3.2 for the optimization of
CCS19), which is based on underlying Learning With
Errors (LWE) and Ring GSW (RGSW) schemes. We
briefly introduce these schemes below. Interested readers
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···

g
g
g

Research subjects

Reference gene
mutation list

Gene sequence

Fig. 1
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Schematic of genetic data preprocessing.
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can access further details in Ref. [17].
2.2.1

LWE scheme

LWE. Setup.1 / ! .ppLWE / W Input the security
parameter , output public parameter ppLWE .
LWE.Enc.m; s/ ! .ct/: Input message m 2 f0; 1g
0
and secret s, output ciphertext ct D .b; a/ 2 T n C1 ,
where real Torus T D R mod 1, n0 is the dimension
of a.
We describe here a symmetric encryption for
simplicity, but this algorithm can be replaced by
any LWE-style encryption schemes, such as public
key encryption[18] . The requirement is that the output
0
ciphertext must be a vector ct D .b; a/ 2 T n C1
satisfying b C ha; si  m.mod 1/=4.
LWE.KSGen.t; s/ ! .KS D fKSj gj 2Œ1;n00  2
0
00
00
.T dks .n C1/ /n /: Input LWE secrets t 2 Z1;n before
0
switching, and s 2 Zn after switching, output key0
00
switching key KS D fKSj gj 2Œ1;n00  2 .T dks .n C1/ /n ,
where n00 and n0 are the dimensions of LWE sample, and
dks is the decomposing parameter.
We can transform an LWE ciphertext corresponding
to t into another LWE encryption of the same
message under the secret s using a key-switching
key LWE.KSGen.t; s/ ! .KS D fKSj gj 2Œ1;n00  2
0
00
.T dks .n C1/ /n /.
LWE.MKSwitch.ct ; KS/ ! .ct 0 /: Input extended
00
ciphertext ct D .b; a1 ; : : : ; ak / 2 T k n C1 , and keyswitching keys KS D fKSi D fKSi;j gj 2Œ1;n00  gi 2Œ1;k ,
00
output ct 0 D .b 0 ; a01 ; : : : ; a0k / 2 T k n C1 , where k is
the number of the users involved in the key-switching
process.
Here, we consider the notion of the extended LWE
encryption and the multi-keyswitching procedure. For k
0
LWE secrets s1 ; : : : ; sk 2 Zn , an extended ciphertext
00
ct D .b; a1 ; : : : ; ak / 2 T k n C1 is called an encryption
of m 2 f0; 1g with respect to the concatenated secret
P
sN D .s1 ; : : : ; sk / if b C kiD1 hai ; si i  m.mod 1/=2.
This multi-key-switching algorithm inputs an extended
00
ciphertext ct D .b; a1 ; : : : ; ak / 2 T k n C1 corresponding
to tN D .t1 ; : : : ; tk / and a sequence of key-switching
keys from ti to si , and returns an encryption of the same
message under sN D .s1 ; : : : ; sk /.
2.2.2

RGSW scheme

RGSW:Setup.1 /!.ppRGSW /: Input security parameter
, output public parameter ppRGSW .
RGSW:KeyGen.ppRGSW / ! .z; P/: Input public
parameter ppRGSW , output public key P 2 T d 2 and
0
secret key z, where T D T ŒX =hX N C 1i, where N 0 is

the degree of the polynomial.
RGSW:UniEnc.; z; P/ ! .C; D; F/: Input plaintext
, secret key z, and public key P, output uni-encryption
ciphertext .C; D; F/.
C
RGSW:Expand..C; D; F/; i; fPj gj 2Œ1;k /W Input
ciphertext .C; D; F/, an index for user i , and a sequence
of public keys fPj gj 2Œ1;k , output expanded ciphertext
C.
RGSW:ExtProd.c; C/ ! c0W Input expanded GSW
ciphertext C and expanded RLWE ciphertext c,
output extension product ciphertext c0 , where the
RLWE ciphertext is a pair .b.X /; a.X // 2 R; R D
0
ZŒX =hX N C 1i, and expanded RLWE ciphertext
with respect to the concatenated RLWE secret z D
.1; z1 ; : : : ; zk / 2 RkC1 .
2.2.3

CCS19 scheme

Given the LWE dimension n0 , key distribution , error
parameter ˛, decomposition base Bks and degree dks ,
secret parameter , RLWE dimension N 0 , which has
over R, the
a power of two, the key distribution
error parameter ˇ, the base integer B > 2, and the
decomposition degree d , we generate a random vector
a
U.T d /.
(1) MKHE:Setup.1 /:
– Run LWE:Setup.1 / to generate the parameter
ppLWE .
– Run RGSW:Setup.1 / to generate the parameter
ppRGSW .
– Return the generated public parameters pp D
.ppLWE ; ppRGSW /.
(2) MKHE:KeyGen.pp/:
– Run .z; P/
RGSW:KeyGen.ppRGSW / and set
the public key as PK D P. We write t D .z0 ;
0
zN 0 1 ; : : : ; z1 / 2 ZN for z.X / D z0 C z1 X C   
0
CzN 0 1 X N 1 .
– Sample the LWE secret s D .s1 ; : : : ; sn0 /
.
– Generate ciphertext .Cl ; Dl ; Fl /
RGSW:
UniEnc.sl ; z; P/ for l 2 Œ1; n0  and set the bootstrapping
key as BK D .Cl ; Dl ; Fl /.
– Generate the key-switching key KS
LWE:
KSGen.t; s/.
– Return the secret key s. Publish the triple
.PK; BK; KS/ of the public, bootstrapping, and keyswitching keys, respectively.
(3) MKHE:Enc.m/: For an input bit m 2 f0; 1g, run
LWE:Enc.m/ and return an LWE encryption with the
scaling factor 1/4. The output ciphertext ct D .b; a/ 2
0
T n C1 satisfies b C ha; si  m.mod 1/=4.
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(4) MKHE:Dec.ct ; fsj gj 2Œ1;k /: For a ciphertext ct D
0
.b; a1 ; : : : ; ak / 2 T k n C1 and a tuple of secrets .s1 ; : : : ;
sk /, return the bit m 2 f0; 1g that minimizes jb C
P
k
m=4j .
j D1 haj ; sj i
(5) MKHE.NAND.ct1 ; ct2 ; f.PKj ; BKj ; KSj /gj 2Œ1;k /:
0
This function input two LWE ciphertexts ct1 2 T k1 n C1
0
and ct2 2 T k2 n C1 , where ki is the set of indices of
the parties that are involved in either ct1 or ct2 . In
this function, PKj ; BKj ; and KSj denote public key,
bootstrapping key, and key-switching key, respectively.
This function consists of three steps. The first step
expands the input LWE ciphertexts and evaluates
the NAND gate homomorphically over the encrypted
plaintexts.
0
0
Step 1.1: Extend ct1 2 T k1 n C1 and ct2 2 T k2 n C1
0
0
0
0
to the ciphertexts ct1 2 T kn C1 and ct2 2 T kn C1 ,
respectively, by addtion 0 in corresponding position.
The extended ciphertexts correspond to the concatenated
0
secret key s D .s1 ; : : : ; sk / 2 Zkn , and the plaintexts
remain unchanged. This is simply done by rearranging
the components and putting zeros in the empty slots.
0
0
Step 1.2: Compute ct D .5=8; 0; : : : ; 0/ ct1
0
ct2 .mod 1/.
Step 2.1: For i 2 Œ1; k and l 2 Œ1; n0 , run Ci;l
RGSW:Expand..Ci;l ;Di;l ;Fi;l /;fPj gj 2Œ1;k / to generate
an RGSW encryption of si;l under the secret z D .1; z1 ;
: : : ; zk / 2 RkC1 . Return the shared bootstrapping key
BK WD fCi;l gi 2Œ1;k;l2Œ1;n0  .
0
Step 2.2: Let ct 0 D .b 0 ; a01 ; : : : ; a0k / 2 T k n C1 .
Compute bQ D 2N 0  b 0 and aQ i D 2N 0  a0i . Initialize the
Q
RLWE ciphertext as ACC D . h.X /X b =8; 0/ 2 T kC1 ,
N0

N0

where h.X/ D 1 C X C    C X 2 1 X 2 C1   
0
X N 1.
Step 2.3: Let aQ i D .aQ i;l /l2Œ1;n for i 2 Œ1; k.
Compute
ACC ACCCRGSW:ExtProd..X aQ i;l 1/  ACC; Ci;l /
recursively for all i 2 Œ1; k and l 2 Œ1; n0 .
Step 2.4: Return ACC
.1=8; 0/ C ACC.mod 1/.
Step 3.1: For ACC D .c0 ; c1 ; : : : ; ck / 2 T kC1 , let
b 00 be the constant term of c0 and a00i be the coefficient
vector of ci for i 2 Œ1; k. Construct the LWE ciphertext
0
ct 00 D .b 00 ; a100 ; : : : ; a00k / 2 T kn C1 .
Step 3.2: Let KS D fKSi gi 2Œ1;k . Run the multikey-switching algorithm and return the ciphertext ct
00
LWE:MKSwitch.ct ; KS /.
2.3

Functions for determining location of diseasecausing genes

In this part, we introduce three location functions in
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JWB+17 that are used to locate the positions of diseasecausing genes.
(1) MAX function
The MAX function studies target patients diagnosed
with the same genetic disease and locates the
most frequently mutated genes in all patients. This
function sums up the genetic data of all patients
(after preprocessing), with the position of the gene
corresponding to the maximum summed value marked
as 1 and the rest as 0. For the case of two participants,
with inputs of n-bit genetic data x D .x 1 ; : : : ; xn / and
y D .y 1 ; : : : ; yn /, the MAX function outputs b D
.b1 ; : : : ; bn /, where bi D EQ.MAX.ADD.x1 ; y1 /; : : : ;
ADD.xn ; yn //; ADD.xi ; yi //. ADD./ outputs the n-bit
sum of the two input genetic data, MAX./ obtains the
maximum value of the n input data, EQ./ outputs 1 if
the two input data are equal and 0 if not. Figure 2 shows
an example of the MAX function.
For Boolean circuit implementation, the MAX
function is realized by the addition circuit “ADD”, max
circuit “MAX”, and equality circuit “EQ” (all of which
can be constructed by the NAND gate). Figure 3 shows
the specific circuit structure.
(2) Intersection function
The intersection function can be used to locate a
commonly mutated gene in patients with the same
genetic disease or who shows the same symptoms, with
only the position of the mutated gene that appears
in all the involved patients marked as 1. For the
case of two participants, with inputs of n-bit genetic
data x D .x 1 ; : : : ; xn / and y D .y 1 ; : : : ; yn /, the
intersection function outputs b D .b1 ; : : : ; bn /, where
···
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bi D AND.xi ; yi /. Figure 4 shows an example of the
intersection function.
For Boolean circuit implementation, the intersection
function is realized by simple “AND” circuits, the
specific structure of which is presented in Fig. 5.
(3) SET DIFF function
The SET DIFF function is used to locate a mutated
gene that appears only in the child of a family, with
the position of this gene marked as 1. For case of a
family (father, mother, and a child), given the input of
the parents’ n-bit genetic data x D .x 1 ; : : : ; xn / and y D
.y 1 ; : : : ; yn /, and child’s genetic data z D .z1 ; : : : ; zn /,
the SET DIFF function outputs b D .b1 ; : : : ; bn /, where
bi =AND(zi , EQ(0, ADD(xi , yi ))). Figure 6 shows an
example of the SET DIFF function.
For Boolean circuit implementation, the SET DIFF
function is realized by Boolean building blocks,
including the addition circuit “ADD” and the equality
circuit “EQ”. Figure 7 shows the specific circuit
structure.

3
3.1

Secure Scheme for Locating DiseaseCausing Genes
Circuit optimization

(1) Optimization of SET DIFF circuit
Here, we show that the original circuit structure of the
SET DIFF function, which requires complicated circuit
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SET DIFF circuit.

building blocks, i.e., the addition circuit “ADD” and
equality circuit “Q”, can be simplified by the use of brief
“AND” and “NOT” circuits, thus greatly reducing the
complexity of the circuit structure and improving the
implementation efficiency of the SET DIFF function.
The optimized circuit implementation of the SET DIFF
function is as follows:
For the case of a family (father, mother, and a child),
given the inputs of two parents’ n-bit genetic data
x D .x 1 ; : : : ; xn / and y D .y 1 ; : : : ; yn /, and the
child’s genetic data z D .z1 ; : : : ; zn /, the improved
SET DEFF function outputs b D .b1 ; : : : ; bn /, where
bi D AND.AND. xi ; yi /; zi /. Figure 8 shows the
specific circuit structure.
(2) TH-intersection circuit
A malignant mutation at one or more sites in a gene
can cause a genetic disease. For example, Parkinson’s
disease can be caused by one or more malignant
mutations among 135 gene sites, but the three functions
used in [JWB+17] can only be used to locate monogenic
diseases. We present a TH-intersection function that
can be used to locate polygenic diseases by setting an
appropriate threshold, thereby extending the application
scope of location functions.
In this circuit, given the inputs of m n-bit genetic data
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Improved SET DIFF circuit.
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yj D .y j;1 ; : : : ; yj;n /, where j 2 Œ1; m; z D .z1 ; : : : ;
zn / is output, where zi D LT.l; ADD.y1;i ; : : : ; ym;i //.
The “LT” circuit implements less-than operations, which
outputs 1 when the left-side input is less than the rightside inputs. Figure 9 shows the specific circuit structure
of the TH-intersection function.
(3) Top-q circuit
In addition to the TH-intersection, we introduce
another circuit called “Top-q”, which outputs the Topq gene positions with a high frequency of common
mutation among all patients. As such, it can also be
used to diagnose polygenic diseases.
In this circuit, h users’ n-bit genetic vectors xi D
.x i;1 ; : : : ; xi;n /, where i 2 Œ1; h, are input to obtain
output b D .btop-q;1 ; : : : ; btop-q;n /. The specific steps of
Top-q circuit are listed in Algorithm 1.

Subject1

Subject2

Subjectn

y1,1 y2,1 ym ,1

y1,2 y2,2 ym ,2

y1,n y2,n ym,n

ADD

ADD

ADD

l

Figure 10 shows the specific structure of the Top-q
circuit.
3.2

Direct decryption protocol for CCS19

MKHE can be applied to realize secure computation
among multiple parties, and the evaluated ciphertext can
be jointly decrypted by all involved users. However,
sometimes it is not preferred that the final decryption
result be known by all involved users, but rather just
designated user recognized as legitimate, perhaps even
user who had not participated in the computing process.
For this scenario, as shown in the schematic in Fig. 11,
a directed decryption protocol is necessary to enable the
data owners to control their plaintext[15] .
We constructed a directed decryption protocol by adding
the ciphertext of 0 (under the public key of the target
user) to the intermediate decryption result of the users
involved in the homomorphic evaluation. The process of
the directed decryption protocol MKHE:DirDec. / is as

LT

LT

z1

z2

zn

NOT

Fig. 9
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c2¢
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...

...

Algorithm 1 Top-q circuit
Input:
h user’s n-bit genetic vectors xi D .xi;1 ; : : : ; xi;n /, where
i 2 Œ1; h
Output:
b D .btop-q;1 ; : : : ; btop-q;n /
1: for each j 2 Œ1; n do
2:
xN top-1;j D ADD.x1;j ; : : : ; xh;j /;
3: end for
4: for each r 2 Œ1; q
1 do
5:
for each j 2 Œ1; n do
6:
bNtop-r;j D EQ.MAX.xN top-r;1 ; : : : ; xN top-r;n /; xN top-r;j /;
Q
7:
xN top-.rC1/;j D jr D1 .1 bNtop-j;j /xN top-r;j ;
8:
end for
9: end for
10: for each j 2 Œ1; n do
11:
bNtop-q;j D EQ.MAX.xN top-q;1 ; : : : ; xN top-q;n /; xN top-q;j /;
Qk
12:
btop-q;j D 1
bNtop-l;j /;
lD1 .1
13: end for
14: return b D .btop-q;1 ; : : : ; btop-q;n /;

x1,n x2,n xh ,n

x1,1 x2,1 xh ,1

l

l
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Semi-decrypting

ck¢

User 1

Final-decrypting
Evaluated
message m

Fig. 11 Schematic of the directed decryption process in our
MKHE scheme.

340

follows:
MKHE:SemiDec .cN ; si /: For an extended ciphertext
0
cN D .b; a1 ; a2 ; : : : ; ak / 2 T k n C1 and the i-th secret si ,
where 1 6 i 6 k, user i does as follows:
(1) Generate target user’s ciphertext of 0: Input the
target public key of user i  , and compute
0
ci  D MKHE:Enc.pki  ; 0/ D .bi  ; ai  / 2 T n C1 ;
note that bi  D ai  si  C e, where e is a small error.
(2) Output c0i D .bi0 ; a0i / WD .bi  C hai ; si i; ai  / 2
0
T n C1 .
MKHE:FinalDec.b; fcc 0 i gi 2Œ1;k /: For the first entry
b of an input extended ciphertext cN D .b; a1 ; a2 ;
0
: : : ; ak / 2 T k n C1 and the partial decryption
ciphertextsfcc 0 i gi 2Œ1;k , output the bit m 2 f0; 1g which
P
P
minimizes j.b C kiD1 bi0 / h kiD1 a0i ; si  i m=4j.
Lemma 1: Let B denote the bound of noise ei in a
fresh LWE ciphertext c 0i and BN denote the bound of noise
eN in the input ciphertext cN , then the directed decryption
process is correct if
N
jeN C e1 C    C ek j 6 BCkB<q=4:
Note that in most current MKHE schemes (including
the original CCS19), the results of homomorphic
evaluations can only be finally decrypted by users who
were involved in the evaluation process. The directed
decryption protocol designed in this paper allows for the
resulting ciphertext to be decrypted by any legitimate
users. Moreover, as no homomorphic multiplication is
involved in our protocol, there is no need for the use of
techniques to control associated noise.
3.3

Secure scheme for locating disease-causing
genes based on optimized CCS19

In this section, we introduce our secure scheme for
locating disease-causing genes, the main steps of which
are as follows:
(1) Set up: Generate the basic parameters of the
MKHE scheme (CCS19): Medical institutions i first
generate their keys (including public key pki , secret key
ski , and evaluation key evki ), where i 2 Œ1; N , and
N is the number of medical institutions involved in the
scheme, to obtain the gene mutation database.
Preprocessing of genetic data: The medical institution
i creates a mutated bit vector for their research subject,
and compares the gene data of this research subject
with those in the genetic mutation database. A bit-string
xi D .xi;1 ; xi;2 ; : : : ; xi;n / 2 Zn2 is obtained that contains
genetic variation information for the research subject,
where i 2 Œ1; N , and n is the number of items in
the genetic mutation database (for the convenience of
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description, it is assumed that each medical institution
has only one research subject participating in the
calculation).
(2) Encryption: The medical institution i
encrypts the genetic data xi by pki , and obtains
fci;j
MKHE:Enc.pki ; xi;j /gj 2Œ1;n , then uploads the
ciphertext to the cloud, where i 2 Œ1; N .
(3) Homomorphic evaluations: After the cloud
receives the encrypted genetic data fci;j gi 2Œ1;N ;j 2Œ1;n ,
it first extends them to fcNi;j
MKHE:Extend.ci;j ;
.pk1 ; : : : ; pkN /; emi /gi 2Œ1;N ;j 2Œ1;n ; which corresponds
to the secret key sk WD .sk1 jsk2 j   jskN /, and
implements homomorphic evaluations on fcNi;j gi 2ŒN ;j 2Œn
using the location function. It then obtains evaluation
MKHE:Eval.C ; .cN1;j ; pk1 ; evk1 /; : : : ;
result fcj0
.cNN;j ; pkN ; evkN //gj 2Œ1;n , and transfers it to all the
involved medical institutions.
(4) Decryption: When all the involved medical
institutions receive fcj0 gj 2Œ1;n , they implement the
direct decryption protocol described in Section 3.2
to obtain the desired information about the mutation
position that may be causing a genopathy: fxj
MKHE:DirDec..sk1 ; sk2 ; : : : ; skN /; cj0 /gj 2Œ1;n . Figure
12 shows the secure locating pathogenic genes.
The main difference between our scheme and CCS19
is the decryption method, which addresses the security
issues associated with the direct decryption protocol, as
reported in Ref. [15]. Our scheme is semantically secure
under (R)LWE assumptions, and also requires a circular
security assumption that is identical to that of CCS19.

4

Experimental Result

We implemented the secure protocol for locating
pathogenic genes for the intersection and SET DIFF
circuits involving two parties, and the TH-intersection
circuit involving three parties, for which 48-bit genetic
data were input for each party. Table 1 presents
the results. The experimental environment included a
notebook computer of Dell Precision 7530 and a Ubuntu
18.04 Stl computer system, CPU: Intel(R) Core(TM)
i7-8750h, memory: 16 GB.
We used the same LWE and RLWE parameters as
those used in the Tours FHE (TFHE) and CCS19
implementations, which achieved a 152-bit security level,
based on the security analysis reported in Ref. [19].
The dimension of LWE n D 500, the noise parameter
of LWE ˛ D 2:43  10 5 , the degree of polynomial
in RLWE N D 1024, and the noise parameter of
RLWE ˇ D 3:29  10 10 . The term pre-time indicates
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Secure protocol for locating pathogenic genes.

Table 1

Comparison of communication traffic and running time of JWB + 17 and our scheme.
Preprocessing
Intersection
SET DIFF
TH-intersection
Preprocessing
Scheme
communication Communication Running Communication Running Communication Running
running time (s)
traffic (KB)
time (s)
traffic (KB)
time (s)
traffic (KB)
time (s)
traffic (KB)
Not
Not
JWB+17
0
0
144.22
0
1360.80
0
available
available
Our
2.03 (two parties)
7.90
0.98
17.90
1.03
2
7.90
0.05
scheme 3.10 (three parties)

the preprocessing running time, and pre-communication
indicates the preprocessing communication traffic.
The experimental results show that our MKFHEbased scheme has the advantage of low communication
traffic, and the disadvantage of being somewhat slow.
Our communication traffic is reduced by one or two
orders of magnitude compared to JWB+17, but the slow
running time of our scheme is due to its complicated
homomorphic evaluation process. As such, our scheme
is suitable for systems with limited bandwidth. The
JWB+17 tries to reduce its bandwidth using the “twocloud” model, which requires a strong assumption
that the two-cloud servers are non-colluding, which is
impractical in the real world. In addition, the gabled
circuits of Yao’s protocol in JWB+17 cannot be reused,
so the system must construct a new gabled circuit
when starting a new computation. In our scheme,
the ciphertext of the genetic data from all involved
patients can be reused throughout the process, and
each medical institution involved must only upload their

Scheme
JWB+17
Our scheme

encrypted genetic data once. Thus, our scheme supports
more convenient offline operations. Table 2 shows
an overall comparison of JWB+17 and our proposed
scheme.

5

Conclusion

In this paper, we propose a secure frequency-based
scheme for locating disease-causing genes based on
multi-key homomorphic encryption. To locate genes
that may cause polygenic diseases, our scheme
homomorphically analyzes the encrypted genetic data
of multiple medical institutions. Target users can also
be chosen to receive the final result, thereby enhancing
the ability of the data owner to control their genetic
data. The communication cost of our solution is low, and
this scheme is most suitable for systems with limited
bandwidth.
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America, Florianópolis, Brazil, 2014, pp. 3–27.
M. Kim and K. Lauter, Private genome analysis through
homomorphic encryption, BMC Med. Inform. Decis. Mak.,
vol. 15, no. 5, p. S3, 2015.
A. C. C. Yao, How to generate and exchange secrets, in Proc.
of 27 th Annu. Symp. Foundations of Computer Science,
Toronto, Canada, 1986, pp. 162–167.
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